A record that proves itself.
Five stages, in order.
- 01
Created
The application submits an OperationInput. The SDK assigns a random operation id and timestamp.
- 02
Encrypted
Name, recipient, amount and memo are sealed in an AES-256-GCM envelope bound to the operation id. The data key is wrapped for the owner and every authorized viewer.
- 03
Policy evaluated
Public rules (category, asset, mode) and the confidential amount limit are checked on plaintext, locally. A violation stops the pipeline: there is no proof for a violation.
- 04
Proof generated
The amount is committed (Pedersen, ristretto255) and two range proofs show 0 ≤ amount ≤ limit. The proof id is the hash of the proof.
- 05
Verified
The public record is signed (Ed25519) and re-verified from scratch, exactly as an independent verifier would.
Seven layers.
Proof engine
veilops-range-v1: Pedersen commitment + two bit-decomposition range proofs ⇒ 0 ≤ amount ≤ limit.
- —Commitment C = v·G + r·H on ristretto255. H is derived by hash-to-curve, so no one knows its discrete log.
- —Each bit commitment carries a CDS OR-proof (it opens to 0 or 1). Fiat–Shamir with SHA-512 binds every challenge to the operation’s public inputs.
- —The upper bound uses the homomorphism D = max·G − C. Proof size is O(n): tens of KB, not succinct.
- —Unaudited. Treat as experimental.
What gets published.
| Field | Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| operationId | public | Random, unique per operation; part of every Fiat–Shamir challenge. |
| proofId | public | prf_ + truncated SHA-256 of the canonical proof. |
| createdAt | public | ISO-8601 timestamp, covered by the attestation. |
| category · asset · mode | public | Needed for public policy checks. This is metadata. |
| policy { id, maxAmount, rangeBits } | public | The limit is a public input to the proof. |
| amountCommitment | commitment | C = v·G + r·H. Perfectly hiding: reveals nothing about v. |
| envelopeDigest | digest | SHA-256 of the envelope; the ciphertext itself is not published. |
| recipient | mode-dependent | Present only in amount-only mode. |
| proof | proof | veilops-range-v1 proof, base64. O(n) size. |
| attestation | signature | Ed25519 public key + signature over the canonical record. |
What you still have to trust.
The operator’s key
The Ed25519 attestation says who published a record. If the operator key is compromised, an attacker can publish valid-looking records for amounts within policy, but never prove an over-limit amount.
The policy is public
The limit is a public input. Anyone can see that a payroll policy caps payments at a value, though not what any payment was.
Metadata is visible
Timing, category, asset, mode, policy and (in amount-only mode) recipient are public. Volume and frequency analysis remain possible.
Cryptographic assumptions
Discrete log hardness on ristretto255 for binding; SHA-512 modelled as a random oracle for Fiat–Shamir. The construction is classical but this implementation is unaudited.
Your browser
Encryption, proving and verification run in client-side JavaScript. A compromised device or extension can read plaintext before it is sealed.
No chain finality yet
Records are not anchored on any blockchain today. Ordering and existence are only as good as the publisher’s storage.